In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Spinoza and the Theory of Organism HANS JONAS I CARTESIANDUALISMlanded speculation on the nature of life in an impasse: intelligible as, on principles of mechanics, the correlation of structure and function became within the res extensa, that of structure-plus-function with feeling or experience (modes of the res cogitans) was lost in the bifurcation, and thereby the fact of life itself became unintelligible at the same time that the (...) explanation of its bodily performance seemed to be assured. The impasse became manifest in Occasionalism : its tour de force of an extraneous, divine "synchronization" of the outer and the inner world (the latter denied to animals) not only suffered from its extreme artificiality, the common failing of such ad hoc constructions, but even at so high a cost failed to accomplish its theoretical purpose by its own terms. For the animal machine, like any machine, raises beyond the question of the "how" that of the "what for" of its functioning---of the purpose for which it had thus been constructed by its maker.1 Its performance, however devoid of immanent teleology, must serve an end, and that end must be someone's end. This end may (directly) be itself, as indeed Descartes had implied when declaring self-preservation to be the effect of the functioning of the organic automaton. In that case the existence as such of the machine would be its end--either terminally, or in turn to benefit something else. In the former case, the machine would have to be more than a machine, for a mere machine cannot enioy its existence. But since, by the rigorous conception of the res extensa, it cannot be more than a machine, its function and/or existence must serve something other than itself. Automata in Descartes ' time were mainly for entertainment (rather than work). But the raison d'etre of the living kingdom could not well be seen in God's indulging his mechanical abilities or in the amusement of celestial spectators--especially since mere complexity of arrangement does not create new quality and thus add something to the unrelieved sameness of the simple substratum that might enrich the spectrum of being. For quality, beyond the primitive determinations of the extended per se, is the subjective creature of sensation, the confused representation of quantity in a mind; and thus organisms cannot harbor it because as mere machines they lack mentality, and pure spirits cannot because they lack sensuality, or the privilege of confusion and thereby of illusion with its possible enjoyment. And as to their intellectual enjoyment, even that, deprived of the thrill of discovery by the same token, would pale in the contemplation of what to sufficiently large The concept of "machine," adopted for its strict confinementto efficientcause, is still a finalisticconcept,even thoughthe final cause is no longer internal to the entity, as a mode of its own operation,but external to it as antecedent design. [43] 44 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY intellects is nothing but the ever-repeated exemplification of the same few, elementary (and ultimately trivial) truths. There remained, then, the time-honored--Stoic as well as Christian--idea that plants and animals are for the benefit of Man. Indeed, since the existence of a living world is the necessary condition for the existence of any of its members, the self-justifying nature of at least one such member (= species) would justify the existence of the whole. In Stoicism, Man provided this end by his possession of reason, which makes him the culmination of a terrestrial scale of being that is also self-justifying throughout all its grades (the end as the best of many that are good in degrees) ; in Christianity, by his possession of an immortal soul, which makes him the sole imago Dei in creation (the end as the sole issue at stake) ; and Cartesian dualism radicalized this latter position by making man even the sole possessor of inwardness or "soul" of any kind, thus the only one of whom "end" can meaningfully be predicated as he alone can entertain ends. All other life then, the product of physical necessity, can be considered his means. However, this traditional idea, in its anthropocentric vanity never a... (shrink)

Qual è il valore pratico della filosofia? La tradizione tramanda un verdetto duplice. Da una parte, il sapiente è colui che sa vivere, poiché conosce cosa è bene e come realizzarlo; dall’altra, il filosofo è inesperto del mondo ed esibisce in prima persona l’inutilità del suo sapere. Ma come si misura l’utilità del sapere filosofico? In questi scritti inediti risalenti agli anni canadesi (1949-1956), tradotti per la prima volta, Hans Jonas si interroga sul significato vitale e umano dell’esperienza filosofica, (...) intrecciando un vivace dialogo con gli autori antichi e lasciando emergere, nel confronto con essi, i lineamenti della sua filosofia dell’organico. (shrink)

Value-freedom or value-neutrality is a well-known topic in the philosophy of science. But what about the value-neutrality of technology, medical or other? Is it too far-fetched to imagine technology as in some sense value-neutral — in view of its intimate connection with purposeful human action? No; unexpected perhaps, but less far-fetched than expected. If we try to conceive of technology as a cognitive possibility abstracted from each and every specific social context, we shall find three senses in which it may (...) be regarded as value-neutral: neutral vis-à-vis different possible uses and ends; neutral before action; neutral qua cognitive object, analogous to the cognitive core of science. The further meanings and implications of these three senses of value-neutrality are discussed.What is this exercise good for? The nature of technology is indeed worth pondering in its own right, not least from this rather unusual angle. But beyond that: as the possible meanings of value-neutrality are tried out, the radical nature of human responsibility for the social implementation of technology will be highlighted. (shrink)

Il pensiero di Hans Jonas, specie per quel che riguarda la cosiddetta “biologia filosofica”, tratta indirettamente del rapporto tra essere umano e animale. A questo riguardo, Jonas rifiuta sia l’approccio dualistico, sia quello monistico-riduzionistico e propende al contrario per una complessiva reinterpretazione del fenomeno della vita nei termini di quel che egli definisce una “rivoluzione ontologica”. In virtù di ciò, il pensatore rintraccia lo specifico del fenomeno della vita e individua nelle forme viventi una scala naturae di complessità, (...) auto-trascendimento e libertà via via crescenti, le cui tappe significative sono la vita organica, quella animale e quella umana. Per quel che concerne la forma animale, varie specie presentano “potenzialità trans-animali”, che evidenziano un ponte biologico e ontologico verso l’essere umano. In altre parole, l’animale è in qualche modo in grado di prefigurare la forma di vita specificamente umana. Tuttavia, sostiene Jonas, non appena quest’ultima fa la propria comparsa, essa è tale per cui se ne evidenzia al tempo stesso anche lo “iato metafisico” rispetto alla vita animale. La specificità umana si manifesta nella propria capacità di essere responsabile e di preservare le condizioni basilari per una vita autentica sul pianeta. (shrink)

In questo saggio si propone una lettura congetturale delle brevi note sulla questione dell’utilità del pensiero filosofico che Hans Jonas appunta in chiusura della conferenza Sulle cause e gli usi della filosofia (1955). A tal fine mi rivolgo innanzitutto alla ricostruzione dell’etica socratica che Jonas elabora nello scritto Virtù e saggezza in Socrate e in seconda battuta alla discussione della dottrina della scienza di Bacon abbozzata in Prospettive filosofiche sulla rilevanza della conoscenza per l’uomo e poi ripresa in (...) scritti successivi. In conclusione offro una ricostruzione dell’idea jonasiana dell’utilità della filosofia come scienza dell’immagine dell’uomo e mostro come tale approccio possa essere significativo anche e soprattutto nell’attuale età tecnologica. -/- English: In this essay I submit an hypothetical reading of the short notes concerning the practical use of phi-losophy which Hans Jonas wrote down at the end of the manuscript Of the causes and uses of phi-losophy. In order to do that, I focus the attention on Socratic Wisdom and Virtue first, where Jonas discussed Socrate’s ethics, and secondly on Jonas’s critique to Francis Bacon's doctrine of science, which he sketched in Some philosophers’ views on the human relevance of knowledge and devel-oped in later writings. My aim is to try and reconstruct Jonas’s ideas concerning the practical value of philosophy as the science of the image of man and to show how this may be relevant to our technological age. (shrink)

Il pensiero di Hans Jonas, specie per quel che riguarda la cosiddetta “biologia filosofica”, tratta indirettamente del rapporto tra essere umano e animale. A questo riguardo, Jonas rifiuta sia l’approccio dualistico, sia quello monistico-riduzionistico e propende al contrario per una complessiva reinterpretazione del fenomeno della vita nei termini di quel che egli definisce una “rivoluzione ontologica”. In virtù di ciò, il pensatore rintraccia lo specifico del fenomeno della vita e individua nelle forme viventi una scala naturae di complessità, (...) auto-trascendimento e libertà via via crescenti, le cui tappe significative sono la vita organica, quella animale e quella umana. Per quel che concerne la forma animale, varie specie presentano “potenzialità trans-animali”, che evidenziano un ponte biologico e ontologico verso l’essere umano. In altre parole, l’animale è in qualche modo in grado di prefigurare la forma di vita specificamente umana. Tuttavia, sostiene Jonas, non appena quest’ultima fa la propria comparsa, essa è tale per cui se ne evidenzia al tempo stesso anche lo “iato metafisico” rispetto alla vita animale. La specificità umana si manifesta nella propria capacità di essere responsabile e di preservare le condizioni basilari per una vita autentica sul pianeta. (shrink)

Il pensiero di Jonas, in particolare quello della sua seconda fase, dedicato alla filosofia della biologia, apre nel confronto filosofico con la scienza nuovi spazi di riflessione critica per la filosofia e per le scienze stesse. In tale incontro entrambe si arricchiscono, acquisendo maggior coscienza metodologica e ampliando le prospettive di osservazione dei fenomeni. Sorge, così, in modo rinnovato, la possibilità di nuove soluzioni interpretative, che, ponendosi al di là di desueti schieramenti ideologici, riescano a comprendere più in profondità (...) la complessità della realtà epocale a cui ci troviamo di fronte e dunque aumentino la capacità di governarla. (shrink)

Nel contributo si analizzano le valutazioni che Ernst Cassirer e Jonas Cohn, in alcuni loro scritti pubblicati tra il 1903 e il 1918, espressero in modo esplicito o implicito l’uno del pensiero dell’altro nelle sfere della teoria della conoscenza e dell’estetica e a proposito della questione del rapporto fra la cultura tedesca e l’ebraismo. Si delineano, allo scopo di comprendere il loro dialogo, i diversi orientamenti della scuola neokantiana marburghese e della scuola neokantiana sud-occidentale, delle quali furono fondatori i (...) loro rispettivi maestri, Hermann Cohen e Wilhelm Windelband. Si ricorda infine l’interesse che ambedue gli autori mostrarono, nelle opere composte durante l’esilio dalla Germania, da cui Cassirer emigrò nel 1933, Cohn nel 1938, per la letteratura religiosa ebraica e cristiana come fonte di concetti filosofici quali l’individuo, l’amore verso l’altro, Dio come persona. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: Jonas was not defending an unrestrained anthropomorphism but, rather, a “zoomorphism,” which offered a rigorous, considered view of the deep phylogenetic origins of purpose and mind. Jonas did not reject science per se, but an alienated, rigid conception of the latter. His work helped pave the way to a richer science of mind.

Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed 'ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that (...) 'purer' and more familiar versions of non-cognitivism will succeed. (shrink)

We critically examine the claim that identity is a fundamental concept. According to those putting forward this thesis, there are four related reasons that can be called upon to ground the fundamental character of identity: identity is presupposed in every conceptual system; identity is required to characterize individuality; identity cannot be defined; the intelligibility of quantification requires identity. We address each of these points and argue that none of them advances compelling reasons to hold that identity is fundamental; in fact, (...) most of the tasks that seem to require identity may be performed without identity. So, in the end, identity may not be a fundamental concept after all. (shrink)

Just as we can be more or less certain about empirical matters, we can be more or less certain about normative matters. Recently, it has been argued that this is a challenge for noncognitivism about normativity. Michael Smith presented the challenge in a 2002 paper and James Lenman and Michael Ridge responded independently. Andrew Sepielli has now joined the rescue operation. His basic idea is that noncognitivists should employ the notion of being for to account for normative certitude. We shall (...) argue that the being for account of normative certitude is vulnerable to many problems shared by other noncognitivist theories. Furthermore, we shall argue that Sepielli’s account has its own problems: His favored normalization procedure for degrees of being for has highly problematic implications. (shrink)

Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution (...) to the problem of accommodating fundamental moral certitude. (shrink)

This article contends that an ethics of care has a particular moral ontology that makes it suitable to argue for the normative significance of relational responsibilities within professional health care. This ontology is relational. It means that moral choices always have to account for the web of relationships, the relational networks and responsibilities that are an essential part of particular moral circumstances. Given this ontology, the article investigates the conditions for health care professionals to be partial and to act on (...) the basis of particular responsibilities to their patients. We will argue that priorities could be partial in three ways: first, because there may be exceptional circumstances that allow for giving priority to one patient over another; second, because the integrity of the patient and a health care worker may be connected in special ways; and, finally, even if impartiality is essential, the institutional basis of health care must always give ample space for an ethically qualified individual and personal care for patients. Even if difficult priorities may be necessary, the conditions of institutional health care should always seek to create the prerequisites for nurses and doctors to administer proper care. (shrink)

This paper serves two purposes: first, the proposition of an ethical fiduciary theory that substantiates the often-cited assertion that the patient–physician relationship is fiduciary in nature; and second, the application of this theory to the case of informed consent. Patients’ decision-making preferences vary significantly. While some seek fully autonomous decision-making, others prefer to delegate parts of their decision. Therefore, we propose an ethical fiduciary theory that allows physician and patient to jointly determine the physician’s role on a spectrum from fiduciary (...) as advisor to fiduciary as agent. Drawing on legal concepts of the fiduciary relationship and on phenomenological accounts of obligation by Lévinas and Løgstrup, our theory relies on the key attributes of trust, vulnerability and otherness. Finally, practical implications of this theory for the informed consent process are developed: we propose a preassessment of patients’ risk and value profiles as well as a restructuring of the oral consent interview and the written consent materials. (shrink)

Da quando Spengler, nel secondo volume del Tramonto dell’Occidente (1922), ha preso a prestito dalla terminologia mineralogica la nozione di «pseudomorfosi» per applicarla alla morfologia delle culture e all’interpretazione dei rapporti fra differenti tradizioni culturali, questo concetto si è ampiamente diffuso nel vocabolario della filosofia e delle scienze umane. Il presente articolo si ripropone di ricostruire alcune tappe fondamentali della storia degli effetti di tale prestito, indagandone al contempo le oscillazioni dello spettro semantico e le implicazioni metodologiche ed epistemologiche. In (...) Spengler il concetto viene assunto in accezione fondamentalmente negativa, per descrivere un fenomeno di costrizione morfologica: una cultura nuova è costretta dalla forza d’inerzia di una cultura precedente ad assumere forme estranee per manifestare i propri contenuti. Diversi lettori del Tramonto mutuano tale termine adattandolo alle proprie ricerche: Jonas per esplorare la relazione fra la gnosi e le tradizioni greca, orientale e cristiana; Mumford per analizzare le connessioni fra i recenti progressi tecnologici e le vecchie forme del potere e dell’economia; Adorno per condannare perniciose mimesi (la filosofia che imita le scienze; l’arte che imita il linguaggio concettuale; la musica che imita la pittura). Tutti condividono l’idea che la pseudomorfosi consista in una falsa manifestazione formale, che finisce per mascherare l’espressione di un contenuto autentico e originario; inoltre, l’adozione di forme vecchie per comunicare contenuti nuovi favorisce analogie e somiglianze meramente superficiali e sostanzialmente infondate. Anche Panofsky accoglie la nozione nella sua iconologia, imprimendo tuttavia al concetto curvature differenti in diversi momenti della sua opera: in Studies of Iconology (1939) si riconosce alla pseudomorfosi una positiva valenza euristica, capace di portare ad espressione, nel Rinascimento, contenuti rimasti inespressi nell’antichità grazie alla sopravvivenza di elementi della mediazione medievale. Una complessa relazione a tre tempi, dunque, che mette in luce un poietico movimento retroattivo del presente sul passato remoto grazie alla metabolizzazione del presente prossimo: una significativa riqualificazione della funzione pseudomorfica (già adombrata dalle ricerche di Warburg sul Nachleben der Antike), che tuttavia si perde nella successiva riflessione panofskyana, dal momento che in Tomb Sculpture (1964) torna a riaffermarsi l’accezione negativa e semplificatoria di pseudomorfosi come apparente ma infondata analogia formale. Assunto in questo senso peggiorativo, il termine trapassa nella successiva storiografia artistica (ad esempio in Rosenblum e Bois). Ma l’affermarsi, in tempi recenti, di una rivalutazione dei fenomeni di anacronismo (Didi-Huberman, Nagel, Wood, Powell) sta comportando, in parallelo, una riqualificazione delle potenzialità euristiche della retroazione pseudomorfica. Per potersi realizzare compiutamente, tale riqualificazione deve accompagnarsi con una coerente teoria delle somiglianze. (shrink)

This article considers the foundation of nursing as a moral practice. Its basic claim is that all nursing knowledge and action reside on a moral foundation. The clinical gaze meets vulnerability in the patient’s human condition. To see a patient’s wound is to see his or her hurt and discomfort; it is a concerned observation. To see the factual and pathophysiological is at the same time to see the ethical: the moral realities of suffering, pain and discomfort. A nurse’s emotional (...) sensitivities are central to understanding a patient’s experiences of illness. Emotions reveal value and ascribe moral importance to certain situations; they are addressed centrally by vulnerability and the moral realities of illness. Hence, the essence of nursing knowledge and nursing performance cannot be understood merely as ontology (i.e. as being-with-the-other). Nursing is basically being-for-the-other; it is responsibility; it is ethics. (shrink)

In Every Thing Must Go James Ladyman and Don Ross argue for a radical version of naturalistic metaphysics and propose that contemporary analytic metaphysics is detached from science and should be discontinued. The present article addresses the issues of whether science and metaphysics are separable, intuitions and understanding should be excluded from scientific theory, and Ontic Structural Realism satisfies the criteria of the radical version of naturalism advanced by Ladyman and Ross. The point underlying those topics is that successful scientific (...) research presupposes metaphysics, and that basic epistemic virtues common to metaphysics and science may allow us—as opposed to what Ladyman and Ross suggest—to increase our understanding of the world and to put constraints on allowable metaphysical theories. (shrink)

Intelligence on mass media audiences was founded on representative statistical samples, analysed by statisticians at the market departments of media corporations. The techniques for aggregating user data in the age of pervasive and ubiquitous personal media build on large aggregates of information analysed by algorithms that transform data into commodities. While the former technologies were built on socio-economic variables such as age, gender, ethnicity, education, media preferences, Big Data technologies register consumer choice, geographical position, web movement, and behavioural information in (...) technologically complex ways that for most lay people are too abstract to appreciate the full consequences of. The data mined for pattern recognition privileges relational rather than demographic qualities. We argue that the agency of interpretation at the bottom of market decisions within media companies nevertheless introduces a ‘heuristics of the algorithm’, where the data inevitably becomes translated into social categories. In the paper we argue that although the promise of algorithmically generated data is often implemented in automated systems where human agency gets increasingly distanced from the data collected, one can observe a felt need among media users and among industry actors to ‘translate back’ the algorithmically produced relational statistics into ‘traditional’ social parameters. The tenacious social structures within the advertising industries work against the techno-economically driven tendencies within the Big Data economy. (shrink)

Making the inevitability of mortality salient makes people more defensive about their self-esteem and worldviews. Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence point to a mediating role of arousal in this defensive process, but evidence from physiological measurement studies is scarce and inconclusive. The present study seeks to draw a comprehensive picture of how physiological arousal develops over time in the mortality salience paradigm, and whether contemplating one’s mortality actually elicits more physiological arousal than reflecting on a death-unrelated aversive control topic. In (...) a between-subjects design, participants were asked two open questions about their mortality or about dental pain. Cardiac, respiratory, and electrodermal indicators of arousal were measured both as participants provided written answers to the questions, and during a series of resting intervals surrounding the questions. A Bayes factor analysis indicated support for the hypothesis that the mortality salience paradigm increases physiological arousal, both while answering the two open-ended questions and afterwards. Regarding the mortality salience versus dental pain comparison, the null hypothesis of no difference was supported for most analysis segments and signals. The results indicate that the arousal elicited by mortality salience is not different from that elicited by dental pain salience. This speaks against the idea that worldview defense following mortality salience occurs because mortality salience produces higher physiological arousal. Of course, this finding does not rule the importance of other forms of arousal (i.e., subjective arousal) for mortality salience effects. (shrink)

Michael Smith has recently argued that non‐cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non‐cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed ‘ecumenical’ versions of non‐cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non‐cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non‐cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that (...) ‘purer’ and more familiar versions of non‐cognitivism will succeed. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss two approaches to the axiomatization of scientific theories in the context of the so called semantic approach, according to which (roughly) a theory can be seen as a class of models. The two approaches are associated respectively to Suppes’ and to da Costa and Chuaqui’s works. We argue that theories can be developed both in a way more akin to the usual mathematical practice (Suppes), in an informal set theoretical environment, writing the set theoretical predicate (...) in the language of set theory itself or, more rigorously (da Costa and Chuaqui), by employing formal languages that help us in writing the postulates to define a class of structures. Both approaches are called internal , for we work within a mathematical framework, here taken to be first-order ZFC. We contrast these approaches with an external one, here discussed briefly. We argue that each one has its strong and weak points, whose discussion is relevant for the philosophical foundations of science. (shrink)

The central challenges for moral fictionalism are twofold: first, to explain how its recommendation that we abandon moral belief and assertion can be reconciled with its rationale of preserving the motivational efficacy of moral thought and discourse; second, to explain what the point is of replacing moral belief and assertion to begin with. This chapter clarifies these challenges and argues that Richard Joyce’s recent “metaphorist” version of fictionalism fares no better with respect to them than his earlier “narrationist” version. Just (...) like its narrationist predecessor, metaphorist fictionalism fails to secure the motivational efficacy of moral thought and talk. The authors also find faults with yet more recent attempts at answering the above challenges for moral fictionalism, leaving the conservationist recommendation a more attractive alternative. This conclusion could be overturned if the conservationist proposal were sufficiently problematic in other respects, but the authors argue that it isn’t. (shrink)

The notion of an individual and the related issues on individuation are topics that appear in the philosophical discussion ever since the antiquity. The idea of an individual thing is intuitively clear: an individual is something of a specific kind that is a unity, having its own identity, and being so that it is possible at least in principle to discern it from any other individual, even of similar species. But when we try to leave the intuitive realm and push (...) this idea to a logical analysis, we find a cluster of problems that are difficult to overcome within standard logico-mathematical contexts. In this work, we shall be concerned with some aspects of this intuitive concept of an individual and on some related facts about individuation taken from recent discussions that arose ever since the inception of quantum theory, pushing the discussion to a “logical” view, which in our opinion is still lacking in the usual debates on such issues. In the final part of the paper, we propose a metaphysics where the notion of identity is substituted, for some objects, by a weaker notion of indiscernibility, and we try to justify such a move. In most of the uses of the expression “quantum theory”, we shall not make explicit the distinction between the non-relativistic and the relativistic approaches, although they of course are quite different, for we think that the problems as we shall present them appear in both versions. But, as the text goes, the context will distinguish between them and these questions will become clear to the reader. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the notions of structure and models within the semantic approach to theories. To highlight the role of the mathematics used to build the structures which will be taken as the models of theories, we review the notion of mathematical structure and of the models of scientific theories. Then, we analyse a case-study and argue that if a certain metaphysical view of quantum objects is adopted, one seeing them as non-individuals, then there would be strong reasons (...) to ask for a different mathematical framework for describing the structures that would be the models of the corresponding theory. In departing from the standard frameworks (those worked on within standard mathematics), we hope to bring to the scene, within the scope of the semantic approach, the importance of paying attention to some fundamental concepts usually only superficially touched by philosophers of science (if touched). (shrink)

Rules of thumb are simple instructions, used to guide actions toward a specific result, without need of advanced knowledge. Knowing adequate rules of thumb is a common form of technological knowledge. It differs both from science-based and intuitive (or tacit) technological knowledge, although it may have its origin in experience, scientific knowledge, trial and error, or a combination thereof. One of the major advantages of rules of thumb is the ease with which they can be learned. One of their major (...) disadvantages is that they cannot easily be adjusted to new situations or conditions. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the phenomenon of superpositions in quantum mechanics and suggest a way to deal with the idea in a logical setting from a syntactical point of view, that is, as subsumed in the language of the formalism, and not semantically. We restrict the discussion to the propositional level only. Then, after presenting the motivations and a possible world semantics, the formalism is outlined and we also consider within this schema the claim that superpositions may involve contradictions, (...) as in the case of the Schrödinger's cat, which is both alive and dead. We argue that this claim is a misreading of the quantum case. Finally, we sketch a new form of quantum logic that involves three kinds of negations and present the relationships among them. The paper is a first approach to the subject, introducing some main guidelines to be developed by a `syntactical' logical approach to quantum superpositions. (shrink)

In the first two volumes of On What Matters,1 Derek Parfit pursued a conciliatory project in normative ethics, which sought to dissolve the disagreement between the most plausible versions of Kantianism, contractualism and rule consequentialism. Parfit was less conciliatory in his meta-ethics, however. Does Parfit’s conciliatory project in metaethics succeed? We shall begin to address this question in the next section by, first, trying to get a grip on Parfit’s position, which now goes by the name ‘non-realist cognitivism’, and, second, (...) by examining his account of properties, and of normative properties in particular. We shall then examine whether Parfit’s triviality objection is effective against Jackson’s brand of naturalism. Finally, we will ask whether Parfit is right to think that his favoured metaethical view converges with what he thinks are the most plausible forms of naturalism and quasirealism,illustrated by Railton’s view and Gibbard’s view, respectively. (shrink)

Our traditional ways of thinking about politics and society are becoming obsolete. We need some new points of reference in order to re-imagine the possible character, growth, and functioning of our private and common life. Such re-imagination would imply doing away with every-man-for-himself individualism as well as consumption-makes-me-happy materialism and the-state-will-take-care-of-it passivity. There is an alternative: Personalism is a forgotten, yet golden perspective on humanity that seeks to describe what a human being is and to then draw the social consequences. (...) Personalism builds upon the thinking of Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas, among others, and has been a source of inspiration for Martin Luther King, Desmond Tutu, and other important personalities in recent history. According to personalism, humans are relational and engaged and possess dignity. The person and the relationship amongst persons are the universal point of departure: Human beings have inherent dignity, and good relationships amongst humans are crucial for the good, engaged life and for a good society. Personalism has been greatly neglected in Western political thought. In this book, Jonas Norgaard Mortensen attempts to introduce personalism while simultaneously demonstrating its historical origins, acquainting the reader with its thinkers and those who have practiced it, and showing that personalism has a highly relevant contribution to make in the debate about today's social and political developments. (shrink)

It is not an exaggeration to say that quantum mechanics is at odds with most of our received metaphysical notions. In particular, an alleged revision is brought about by the theory on the metaphysical notion of ‘individuality’. Certainly, this should figure as being of great interest for metaphysicians and philosophers of science alike. What makes issues even more interesting is that some of the founding fathers of the theory, with their typical philosophical inclinations, suggested that the entities dealt with by (...) the theory had something different regarding individuality: according to them, quantum entities somehow fail individuality. (shrink)

In this moment of rising nationalism worldwide, governments, civil society groups, transnational companies, and web users all complain of increasing regional fragmentation online. While prior work in this area has primarily focused on issues of government censorship and regulatory compliance, we use an inductive and qualitative approach to examine targeted blocking by corporate entities of entire regions motivated by concerns about fraud, abuse, and theft. Through participant-observation at relevant events and intensive interviews with experts, we document the quest by professionals (...) tasked with preserving online security to use new machine-learning based techniques to develop a “fairer” system to determine patterns of “good” and “bad” usage. However, we argue that without understanding the systematic social and political conditions that produce differential behaviors online, these systems may continue to embed unequal treatments, and troublingly may further disguise such discrimination behind more complex and less transparent automated assessment. In order to support this claim, we analyze how current forms of regional blocking incentivize users in blocked regions to behave in ways that are commonly flagged as problematic by dominant security and identification systems. To realize truly global, non-Eurocentric cybersecurity techniques would mean incorporating the ecosystems of service utilization developed by marginalized users rather than reasserting norms of an imagined user that casts aberrations as suspect. (shrink)

Social workers form part of many healthcare teams. This role can involve in-depth conversations with clients and home visits. These encounters can reveal sensitive information, not all of which may be accessible to other members of the healthcare team. Most modern healthcare systems employ shared care records, which are populated by, and accessible to, multiple members of the healthcare team. Shared care records are valued for their capacity to enhance inter-professional communication and improve patient care. But this very capacity may (...) increase an underlying tension between privacy and efficient, effective care. Ethical tensions can arise for health social workers between comprehensive documentation and protecting client privacy by limiting access to privileged information obtained in the context of a social work encounter. This qualitative empirical ethics study investigated health social workers' experiences of tensions between client privacy and maintaining complete records, and how they thought the tension should be resolved. Participant testimony informed a pragmatist approach to identify principles governing recording of sensitive information in shared care records. Three principles were identified: necessity, accuracy, and neutrality. Participants' reports of moral concerns about recording indicate that ethical tensions can occur. The identified principles offer a starting point for managing such tensions. (shrink)

We introduce a framework that allows for the construction of sequent systems for expressive description logics extending ALC. Our framework not only covers a wide array of common description logics, but also allows for sequent systems to be obtained for extensions of description logics with special formulae that we call "role relational axioms." All sequent systems are sound, complete, and possess favorable properties such as height-preserving admissibility of common structural rules and height-preserving invertibility of rules.

In Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque, René Girard attempts to explain how desire has been depicted in different European novels. According to Girard, the lesser novelists have retracted to some kind of romantic worldview in their description of human relationships. While the “romantic writer” does not see that desires are mediated by other people’s desires, and instead describes desire as object-related, linear, and devoid of any ongoing mimetic contagion, a number of novelists, are, nonetheless, able to reveal the illusion of (...) romantic desire. In Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, the author tries to peer into the desires that govern Emma Bovary's relentless search for a romantic life.... (shrink)

Nonreflexive quantum mechanics is a formulation of quantum theory based on a non- classical logic termed nonreflexive logic. In these logics, the standard notion of identity, as encapsulated in classical logic and set theories, does not hold in full. The basic aim of this kind of approach to quantum mechanics is to take seriously the claim made by some authors according to whom quantum particles are non-individuals in some sense, and also to take into account the fact that they may (...) be absolutely indistinguishable. The nonreflexive formulation of quantum theory assumes these features of the objects already at the level of the underlying logic, so that no use is required of symmetrization postulates or other mathematical devices that serve to pretend that the objects are indiscernible. Here, we present the ideas of the development of nonreflexive quantum mechanics and discuss some philosophical motivations and consequences of it. (shrink)

It is a central tenet of (neo-)Aristotelian metaphysics that reality is structured by relations of existential priority or, conversely put, existential dependence: some entities depend for their existence on other entities that help to bring about their existence. After briefly looking at the origins of this idea in Aristotle’s Categories, the chapter examines some contemporary definitions of existential dependence. A notion of existential dependence defined in terms of metaphysical explanation is shown to fulfill numerous Aristotelian desiderata. It is discussed how (...) such explanations can be underwritten by conceptual connections and at the same time be a guide to the priority-structure of non-linguistic reality; finally, the chapter defends the proposed notion of existential dependence against objections from the recent literature. (shrink)

Quantum theory is perhaps our best confirmed theory for a description of the physical properties of nature. On top of demonstrating great empirical effectiveness, many technological developments in the 20th century (such as the interpretation of the periodic table of elements, CD players, holograms, and quantum state teleportation) were only made possible with Quantum theory.Despite its success in the past decades, even today it still remains without a universally accepted interpretation.This book provides an interdisciplinary perspective on the question; 'What is (...) Quantum Mechanics talking about?', a question which continues to be one of the most fascinating and important questions in science.Using an interdisciplinary approach to foundational problems in Quantum Mechanics (QM), ranging from philosophical questions about the interpretation of QM to technical problems in quantum computation, this book explores quantum mechanics from different perspectives (physical, logical, philosophical and mathematical), by researchers from Europe, North America, and South America. (shrink)

RESUMO No Livro I, parte IV, do "Tratado da natureza humana", Hume desenvolve aquilo que vamos chamar de lógica da ficção. Não se trata de um simples erro da imaginação enquanto fantasia, mas de uma propensão a criar ideias, entidades e objetos a partir das percepções presentes na mente. O que resulta daí é um sentido rico e novo de ficção que permite a Hume desenvolver uma história natural da filosofia, descrevendo a gênese inevitável de conceitos metafísicos. Partindo de uma (...) inspiração kantiana, iremos abordar esse tema ressaltando as semelhanças e diferenças entre as ficções naturais e a ilusão transcendental. ABSTRACT In Book I, part IV, of the "Treatise of Human Nature", Hume develops what we will call logic of fiction. It is not the case of a mere error of imagination as fancy, but a tendency to feign ideas, entities and objects from the perceptions in the mind. The result is a rich and new sense of fiction that allows Hume to establish a natural history of Philosophy, describing the unavoidable genesis of metaphysical concepts. From a Kantian point of view, we will approach this subject by highlighting the similarities as well as the differences between the natural fictions and the transcendental illusion. (shrink)